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Per the chapter reading, write a one-page summary that includes the history of landmark cases that grant due process rights and procedures to juveniles and your understanding

The juvenile justice system oversees adjudications for juvenile offenders in juvenile courts. A juvenile offender is a youth under the age of 18 or the age of majority, depending on state statute. A juvenile, or delinquent, is said to commit delinquent acts rather than crimes. This language is consistent with the primary goal of the juvenile system, which is rehabilitation, treatment, and successful reintegration into the community.

For the last 40 years, the United States Supreme Court has rendered several important cases affecting the constitutional rights, treatment, and adjudication of delinquents in the juvenile justice system.


Per the chapter reading, write a one-page summary that includes the history of landmark cases that grant due process rights and procedures to juveniles and your understanding of the following Supreme Court decisions, especially as they pertain to the death penalty and requirements for life imprisonment without parole.

Graham v. Florida
560 U.S. 48 (2010)

Decided: May 17, 2010

Vote:   6 (Roberts, JStevensKennedyGinsburgBreyerSotomayor)
3 (ScaliaThomasAlito)

Opinion of the Court: Kennedy
Concurring Opinion: Stevens (Ginsburg, Sotomayor)
Concurring in Judgment: Roberts, J
Dissenting Opinion: Thomas (Scalia, Alito)
Dissenting Opinion: Alito
Oral Arguments: Transcript

Graham v. Florida , decided by a 6-3 vote, May 17, 2010; Kennedy wrote the opinion; Thomas, Scalia, and Alito dissented.

A juvenile offender cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for a non-homicide offense.

The ruling, based on the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments,” bars a sentence that had been rarely imposed but permitted under federal law and the laws of thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia. In direct effect, the decision required a new sentence for a Florida inmate, Terrance Jamar Graham, who was given life-without-parole after committing a home burglary on December 2, 2004, thirty-four days short of his eighteenth birthday. Earlier, Graham had pleaded guilty in December 2003 to armed burglary and attempted armed robbery for a botched break-in of a Jacksonville restaurant. He was placed on three-years’ probation with formal adjudication for the offense withheld after telling the judge, “I’ve decided to turn my life around.” In the second offense, Graham and two twenty-year-olds broke into a home, held the resident at gunpoint, ransacked the premises, barricaded the resident and his friend in a closet, and then left. A different judge found Graham guilty of violating his probation conditions, revoked the probation, and imposed a life term without eligibility for parole—overriding the prosecution’s recommendation for sentences of thirty years for the armed burglary and fifteen years for the attempted armed robbery. The sentence was affirmed by an intermediate appellate court and left standing by the Florida Supreme Court. In appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court, Graham cited the decision in Roper v. Simmons (2005) prohibiting the death penalty for juvenile offenders under the Eighth Amendment.

The Supreme Court set aside Graham’s sentence, with a five-justice majority agreeing that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits sentencing a juvenile offender to life in prison without possibility of parole for a non-homicide offense. Writing for the Court, Kennedy quoted extensively from Roper, where he also wrote for a five-justice majority. “Roper established that because juveniles have lessened culpability, they are less deserving of the most severe punishments,” Kennedy wrote. He went on to cite the relative rarity of life-without-parole sentences for juvenile non-homicide offenders—129 inmates currently serving such terms in the United States, including seventy-seven in Florida—as “evidence of a consensus” against the imposition of a penalty that he said was “especially harsh” for a juvenile.

As further support for the decision, Kennedy said that only eleven other countries authorized life without parole for juvenile offenders and none of them actually imposed the sentence for non-homicide offenses. “The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide,” Kennedy concluded. “A State need not guarantee the offender eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.”

Four justices joined Kennedy’s opinion: Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Roberts said he would reverse Graham’s sentence based on the Court’s previous rulings barring “grossly disproportionate” sentences under the Eighth Amendment. Graham “committed serious offenses, for which he deserves serious punishment,” Roberts wrote. But, he continued, “Graham’s age—together with the nature of his criminal activity and the unusual severity of the sentence—tips the constitutional balance” against the term imposed. Roberts added, however, “Some crimes are so heinous, and some juvenile offenders so highly culpable, that a sentence of life without parole may be entirely justified under the Constitution.”

In the dissenting opinion, Thomas argued the majority was improperly overriding legislative judgments that actually reflected a national consensus in favor of the availability of a life-without-parole sentence for some juvenile offenders. “[N]either objective evidence of national consensus nor the notions of culpability on which the Court’s ‘independent judgment’ relies can justify the categorical rule it declares here,” he wrote. In an initial section, Thomas disputed the Court’s role in reviewing sentences for proportionality at all, saying the decisions were “entirely the Court’s creation” and had no “principled foundation.”

Scalia joined Thomas’s opinion in full; Alito joined the section dealing with Graham’s sentence, but not the section rejecting the proportionality review of sentencing. In a brief additional dissent, Alito also emphasized that the ruling would permit a juvenile offender to be sentenced to a lengthy prison term—for example, forty years—without eligibility for parole.

Roper v. Simmons
543 U.S. 551 (2005)

Decided: Mar. 1, 2005

Vote:   5 (StevensKennedySouterGinsburgBreyer)
4 (RehnquistO’ConnorScaliaThomas)

Opinion of the Court: Kennedy
Concurring Opinion: Stevens (Ginsburg)
Dissenting Opinion: O’Connor
Dissenting Opinion: Scalia (Rehnquist, Thomas)

Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center v. Simmons, decided by a 5-4 vote, March 1, 2005; Kennedy wrote the opinion; Scalia, Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Thomas dissented.

Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death by a St. Louis court for a gruesome murder that he helped commit in 1993 when he was seventeen. Ten years later, the Missouri Supreme Court overturned the death sentence on the ground that executing a juvenile offender amounted to “cruel and unusual” punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

Lawyers for the state appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which had upheld the execution of older teenagers in a closely divided decision in 1989. In a change of course, however, the Court in 2005 used Simmons’s case to prohibit the execution of juvenile offenders nationwide.

A majority of justices in the 5-4 decision said that juveniles were less culpable and less able to control their actions than adult offenders and that a “national consensus” had formed against executing juvenile offenders since the Court’s previous ruling. The dissenting justices sharply criticized the ruling, saying it was based on little more than the “subjective” views of the majority.

Background. Capital punishment had been a divisive issue for the Court since the 1970s when it first threw out all existing death sentences in 1972 and then allowed capital punishment to resume in 1976 if juries were given guidelines for imposing the death penalty. Over the next two decades, the Court ruled out capital punishment in some specific types of cases—for example, rape—but rejected broader constitutional challenges.

Twice in the late 1980s, the Court considered the constitutionality of executing persons for offenses committed while under the age of eighteen. In Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988), a fractured 5-3 majority effectively forbade the execution of juvenile offenders under the age of sixteen. But one year later, the Court voted 5-4 in Stanford v. Kentucky to uphold capital punishment for defendants from Kentucky and Missouri who were sentenced to death for murders committed at the ages of seventeen and sixteen, respectively.

O’Connor cast the pivotal vote in both cases. She cited what she called a “national consensus” against execution of fifteen-year-olds and the absence of such a consensus against execution of older teenagers. O’Connor also wrote the Court’s opinion in another 5-4 decision in 1989 that allowed execution of mentally retarded offenders (Penry v. Lynaugh).

The Court reversed itself on the mental retardation issue in 2002. With O’Connor and Kennedy in the majority, the Court held, 6-3, that execution of mentally retarded offenders amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Stevens’s opinion in Atkins v. Virginia found a “national consensus” against the practice on the basis of the declining number of states that permitted it. In a footnote, Stevens also noted that execution of mentally retarded offenders was “overwhelmingly disapproved” in “the world community.” Dissenting justices criticized both bases for the decision.

When the Court reconvened in October 2002, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer signaled that they were similarly ready to bar execution of juvenile offenders. The four dissented from the Court’s refusal to issue a writ of habeas corpus to overturn the death sentence imposed on Kevin Stanford, the Kentucky inmate in the 1989 decision. O’Connor and Kennedy were silent.

The Case. Christopher Simmons was a high school junior in the St. Louis suburb of Fenton in September 1993 when he and a fifteen-year-old friend murdered an elderly woman named Shirley Crook, who was apparently chosen at random, merely for the sake of the killing. The two youths used an unlocked window to gain access to Crook’s home and then used duct tape to cover her eyes and mouth and bind her hands. They then used Crook’s minivan to drive her to a railroad trestle spanning the Meramec River, where they tied her hands and feet together before throwing her off the bridge. Crook’s body was recovered the next afternoon.

Evidence at his trial, which was conducted after Simmons had turned eighteen, showed that he had talked beforehand about committing a murder and had speculated to his friends that they could “get away with it” because they were minors. Simmons confessed to the killing when he was arrested the next day, and the defense presented no evidence during the guilt phase of the trial.

In the sentencing phase, Simmons’s lawyer introduced evidence showing that the youth had no prior criminal record and had helped take care of his grandmother and his younger half-brothers. In the closing argument, Simmons’s lawyer argued that his age was a mitigating factor. The prosecutor disagreed. “Seventeen years old?” the prosecutor said. “Isn’t that scary?”

The jury imposed the death penalty, which was affirmed on direct appeal through state courts and upheld again in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. After the Atkins decision, however, Simmons’s lawyer raised the age issue again in a new habeas corpus petition in state court.

In a surprising decision, the Missouri Supreme Court in 2003 applied the new decision against executing mentally retarded offenders to rule, 4-3, that execution of juvenile offenders was also constitutionally prohibited. The majority justices pointed out that execution of juvenile offenders was relatively rare and the number of states allowing the practice had declined since the Supreme Court’s 1989 ruling on the issue. They also noted that a large number of professional and religious groups had criticized the practice and that only two countries—Iran and the Congo—had executed juvenile offenders in the past few years.

The dissenting justices complained that the state supreme court had no authority to overrule a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. The state cited that issue along with the main constitutional question in asking the Supreme Court to review the decision. The Court agreed to hear the case on January 26, 2004, and set the case for argument in October.

Arguments. Liberal and conservative justices made their opposing views in the case abundantly clear during oral arguments on October 13. But the pivotal justices, O’Connor and Kennedy, were harder to read. O’Connor asked only one question, while Kennedy’s more active questioning suggested that he felt conflicted on the issue.

Missouri’s state solicitor James Layton opened by urging the Court to reaffirm its 1989 ruling, which was rejected by the Missouri high court, and leave it to legislatures to set the minimum age for capital punishment and to juries to determine its use in individual cases. “There are 17-year-olds who are equally culpable” with older offenders, Layton said.

Ginsburg interrupted to note that eighteen was the minimum age for such things as buying tobacco. “Why should it be that someone is death-eligible under the age of eighteen but not eligible to be an adult member of the community?” she asked. Scalia questioned the reasoning. Why not exempt juveniles from all criminal laws? Scalia asked. “I don’t see where there’s a logical line.”

In her sole question, O’Connor asked what weight to give to the number of states that permitted execution of juvenile offenders—about the same number, she said, as had allowed the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders before Atkins. Layton replied that in contrast to the situation in Atkins, there was no “inexorable trend” in the states against execution of older teens.

Later, Kennedy asked whether the U.S. position as one of the few countries to permit execution of juvenile offenders showed the practice to be “unusual.” Again, Layton demurred. The meaning of the Eighth Amendment, he said, “should not be based on what happens in the rest of the world.”

Representing Simmons, Seth Waxman, a former U.S. solicitor general, opened by arguing that a national consensus had emerged against executing juvenile offenders. In addition, he pointed to new scientific evidence about teenagers’ cognitive development that showed them to be less able to control their actions than adults and on that basis to be less morally culpable than adult offenders.

Rehnquist and Scalia challenged Waxman lightly as he began, then more forcefully later. “If all this is so clear, why can’t the legislature take it into account?” Scalia asked. Rehnquist questioned the failure to introduce the evidence in either the federal or state habeas corpus proceeding.

Kennedy also voiced doubts. Why couldn’t the juvenile’s culpability be decided case by case, he asked. Breyer suggested an answer. A juvenile offender goes through “a lot of changing” before being brought to trial, Breyer said, because “their personality is not fully formed.” But Scalia objected. “If you have someone who commits a heinous crime and by the time he’s brought to trial and convicted, he’s come to Jesus, we don’t let him off,” Scalia said.

As Waxman neared the end of his time, Kennedy had one other concern. Would abolishing the death penalty for juvenile offenders mean that youth gangs would turn to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds to carry out killings? he asked. In reply, Waxman returned to the evidence of juvenile offenders’ impulsiveness, saying the availability of the death penalty would have little deterrent effect.

Decision. Kennedy cast the decisive vote and wrote for the majority in the March 1 decision holding the death penalty to be a “disproportionate” punishment for juvenile offenders. Kennedy first cited “objective indicia of consensus” against the practice, including the small number of executions of juvenile offenders, as well as “the Court’s own determination” of “the diminished culpability of juveniles” compared to adult offenders.

On the first issue, Kennedy noted that before the Missouri court’s decision, thirty states barred the execution of juvenile offenders, including twelve with no death penalty and eighteen others that set the minimum age at eighteen. Even in the other twenty states, Kennedy said, the practice was “infrequent.” In the previous ten years, he said, only three states had executed juvenile offenders: Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. Finally, Kennedy noted that the trend among the states was only in the direction of abolishing capital punishment for juveniles, with no state having voted in the previous fifteen years to reinstate it. On that basis, Kennedy concluded, there was “sufficient evidence” that society viewed juveniles as “categorically less culpable than the average criminal”—the same language used in Atkins to describe mentally retarded offenders.

On the second issue, Kennedy cited three factors as demonstrating that juveniles “cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders” and therefore made eligible for the death penalty. First, he said, “a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility” among juveniles often result in “impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.” Second, juveniles “are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.” Third, “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”

Recognition of those factors, Kennedy said, made it evident that the justifications for capital punishment—retribution and deterrence—“apply to [juveniles] with lesser force than to adults.” Retribution is “not proportional,” he said, if the penalty is imposed on someone whose culpability is diminished “by reason of youth and immaturity.” He also said that it was “unclear whether the death penalty has a significant or even measurable deterrent effect on juveniles.”

Kennedy rejected arguments that juries should be allowed to consider such factors on a case-by-case basis. “The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability,” he wrote. He justified the age of eighteen as a dividing line because of its use in dividing childhood and adulthood in other contexts, such as voting.

In a final section, Kennedy also noted as “confirmation” what he called “the stark reality” that the United States was the only country to officially sanction the juvenile death penalty. Only seven countries had executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and China. “The United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the death penalty,” he said.

Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Kennedy’s opinion—the same four justices who had favored granting habeas corpus to Stanford, the death row inmate from the earlier case. Kennedy noted in his opinion that the governor of Kentucky had cited the Court’s Atkins decision in late 2003 in commuting Stanford’s sentence to life imprisonment.

In a sharply written dissent delivered from the bench, Scalia argued that the majority was wrong in discerning a consensus against executing juvenile offenders and in looking to international practice for guidance on the issue. He also criticized the majority for applying the Eighth Amendment based on what the Court in a 1958 opinion had called “the evolving standards of decency.”

“The Court thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation’s moral standards—and in the course of discharging that awesome responsibility purports to take guidance from the views of foreign court and legislatures,” Scalia wrote. “Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment . . . should be determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I dissent.” Rehnquist and Thomas joined his opinion.

Dissenting separately, O’Connor said that states could reasonably conclude that “at least some 17-year-old murderers are sufficiently mature to deserve the death penalty” and that capital sentencing juries had not been shown to be “incapable of accurately assessing a youthful defendant’s maturity or of giving due weight to the mitigating characteristics associated with youth.” She specifically noted, however, that she agreed with the majority’s use of “evolving standards of decency” in Eighth Amendment cases. She also rejected Scalia’s argument that foreign and international law have “no place” in Eighth Amendment cases.

Reaction. The ruling, affecting seventy-two inmates on death rows in twelve states, drew wide praise from groups opposed to the death penalty as well as such establishment organizations as the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association. Richard Dieter, executive director of the Death Penalty Information Center, called the ruling “a victory for the American people.”

Pro-law enforcement groups complained about the decision, but in somewhat measured terms. “Why should five people get to judge morality for the entire country?” asked Charles Hobson, a lawyer with the California-based Criminal Justice Legal Foundation. Public disapproval of the decision did not appear to be widespread or strong.

Dieter said the ruling indicated the justices would continue to closely scrutinize capital cases and might return to claims that the Court had previously treated as closed, such as racial discrimination. But current and former prosecutors cautioned against reading too much into the ruling. “It’s not a harbinger of the end of the death penalty,” Joshua Marquis, co-chair of the capital litigation committee of the National District Attorneys Association, told the New York Times.

Simmons himself remained in prison under a life sentence without possibility of parole. Jefferson County prosecutor Bob Wilkins told the St. Louis Post-Dispatch that his predecessor had been right to try the case as capital murder. “The facts of the case called for the death penalty,” he said. For her part, Elaine Wild, Crook’s sister, told the newspaper she was dismayed by the decision. “I don’t think it’s right,” she said. “This was a planned murder, not maybe to the point of it being Shirley, but somebody in that neighborhood.”

Miller v. Alabama 
567 U.S. ——— (2012)

Decided: Jun. 25, 2012

Vote:   5 (KennedyGinsburgBreyerSotomayorKagan)
4 (Roberts, JScaliaThomasAlito)

Opinion of the Court: Kagan
Concurring Opinion: Breyer (Sotomayor)
Dissenting Opinion: Roberts, J (Scalia, Thomas, Alito)
Dissenting Opinion: Thomas (Scalia)
Dissenting Opinion: Alito (Scalia)
Oral Arguments: Transcript | Audio

Miller v. Alabama , decided by a 5–4 vote, June 25, 2012; Kagan wrote the opinion; Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented.

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment forbids sentencing schemes that mandate life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile murderers.

The ruling set aside life-without-parole sentences imposed in separate murder cases in Alabama and Arkansas against defendants fourteen years of age at the time of the offenses. Evan Miller was convicted in an Alabama state court of murder in the course of an arson and murder in the course of a robbery for his part in the fire-related death of a neighbor, Cole Cannon, on July 15, 2003. Miller and a teenaged friend robbed Cannon of $300, beat him with a baseball bat and fists, and started a fire to cover up evidence of the beating; after they left the scene, Cannon died of smoke inhalation. Kuntrell Jackson was convicted of capital felony murder for his part in the November 18, 1999, shotgun killing of a video store clerk in Blytheville, Arkansas, during a botched robbery attempt. Jackson was not the shooter but knew his friend had a weapon and was in the store when the shooting occurred. Both states had permitted the death penalty for juvenile murderers, but the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons (2005) eliminated that option and left a mandatory life-without-parole sentence as the only option for the specific murder counts at issue.

The Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida (2010) prohibited life-without-parole for juvenile offenders in nonhomicide cases as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments. Miller on direct appeal and Jackson in a state habeas corpus proceeding cited Graham to argue that their sentences also violated the Eighth Amendment. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Miller’s appeal, and the Alabama Supreme Court declined to review the decision. The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected Jackson’s petition; two justices dissented on the ground that the prosecution had failed to show an intent to kill on Jackson’s part. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and scheduled them for argument in tandem.

In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that Arkansas and Alabama’s mandatory sentencing schemes were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment and that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing life without parole on juveniles in murder cases. Writing for the majority, Kagan said Roper and Graham led to the conclusion that “mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.” Citing Graham, Kagan said that children are “constitutionally different from adults” for purposes of sentencing because of their lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility. Kagan found that the mandatory penalty schemes improperly ignored the role of age in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without parole. “By removing youth from the balance,” she wrote, “these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.” The mandatory provisions also ran afoul of the Court’s decisions requiring individualized sentencing in capital cases, Kagan reasoned. “Graham and Roper and our individualized sentencing cases alike teach that in imposing a State’s harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an adult,” she wrote. Kagan rejected the argument for a categorical ban on life without parole for juveniles but suggested that “appropriate occasions” for the penalty would be “uncommon.”

The ruling reversed the state courts’ judgments and sent the cases back for further proceedings. Four justices joined Kagan’s opinion: Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. In a concurring opinion, Breyer specified that Jackson should not be subject to life without parole unless the state proves an intent to kill. “Given Graham’s reasoning,” Breyer wrote, “the kinds of homicide that can subject a juvenile offender to life without parole must exclude instances where the juvenile himself neither kills nor intends to kill the victim.” Sotomayor joined his opinion.

In three separate opinions, the four justices who had dissented in Graham all rejected the ruling on the general ground that the Constitution left it up to legislatures, not the Court, to determine whether to allow life without parole for juvenile murderers. “Neither the text of the Constitution nor our precedent prohibits legislatures from requiring that juvenile murderers be sentenced to life without parole,” Roberts wrote in the longest of the three opinions and the only one joined by the other dissenters: Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.

In his opinion, Roberts insisted that he was not questioning the Court’s prior rulings. In his opinion, however, Thomas repeated his earlier criticism of the Eighth Amendment and individualized sentencing precedents and called the new ruling “even less legitimate than the foundation on which it is built.” Scalia joined his opinion.

In the shortest of the dissents, Alito vigorously criticized the effect of the decision and emphasized his disagreement by reading portions of his opinion from the bench. “Even a 17-1/2-year-old who sets off a bomb in a crowded mall or guns down a dozen students and teachers is a ‘child’ and must be given a chance to persuade a judge to permit his release into society,” Alito wrote. “Nothing in the Constitution supports this arrogation of legislative authority.”

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